Only Through Mediation Will the Tanks Retreat

IT IS ALWAYS UNCERTAINTY THAT LEADS TO WAR. WHEN A MEDIATOR INTERVENES, THE OUTBREAK OF ARMED CONFLICT BECOMES LESS LIKELY, AND OFTEN THE ARMS RACE IS ALSO INTERRUPTED

by Massimo Morelli, Bocconi Department of Social and Political Sciences
Translated by Richard Greenslade


In a situation of conflict, communication between the parties is of the utmost importance, especially when the causes of the conflict itself involve the absence of precise information. And in this, the figure of the mediator can play a key role.

In my recent publication in the Journal of Political Economy with Adam Meirowitz (University of Utah), Kristopher W. Ramsay (Princeton University) and Francesco Squintani (Warwick University), entitled Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization, we have derived surprising results on the importance of mediators for the resolution of conflicts and for incentives to armament (nuclear or non).

It is uncertainty, in fact, that can lead to war. A strong country that is unable to evaluate the strength of the enemy can well be induced to launch an attack if it thinks that with high probability the enemy is weaker. Maybe it would not attack if it had clearer and more precise information.

A weak country, on the other hand, does not want to reveal itself to be weak: in this case, a direct line of communication in general is of little use.

The figure of the mediator, from Kissinger to Carter, up to Kofi Annan, serves precisely to increase the incentives to reveal, at least to the mediator, information that can help the mediator to formulate a peace proposal that constitutes a reasonable compromise. The most surprising result of our study, however, is that the presence of institutional mediators can even discourage countries from pursuing the arms race. This can happen if mediation is perceived as the main form of communication in the event of conflict.

Mediation has taken hold above all as an alternative to arbitration in the judicial sector, but this new information on the disincentive effect of mediation on arms buildup should be a decisive stimulus to make the United Nations orient itself toward this kind of intervention.

In an article not yet published with the same authors we show that, unlike mediation, most other common intervention policies lead instead to exacerbating conflicts. For example, if the United Nations were to follow a constant policy of intervention alongside or in support of minority rebel groups, such groups would have much more ex ante incentive to start conflicts. If then the expected help is late in coming, the conflict that has already begun can lead to great bloodshed. A policy of almost exclusive mediation by international organizations is therefore preferable.